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Abstract
We use a recently developed right-tail variation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test to
identify and date-stamp periods of mildly explosive behavior in the weekly time series of eight U.S. fixed
income yield spreads between September 2002 and April 2018. We find statistically significant evidence
of mildly explosive dynamics in six of these spreads, two of which are short/medium-term mortgage-
related spreads. We show that the time intervals characterized by instability that we estimate from
these yield spreads capture known episodes of financial and economic distress in the U.S. economy. Mild
explosiveness migrates from short-term funding markets to medium- and long-term markets during the
Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Furthermore, we statistically validate the conjecture that the initial
panic of 2007 migrated from segments of the ABX market to other U.S. fixed income markets in the
early phases of the financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
Researchers and practitioners view U.S. fixed income markets as the epicenter of the Great Financial
Crisis of 2007-09. Security yields in these markets are generally used to construct yield spreads that are
widely adopted in theoretical and empirical modeling in macroeconomics and finance and as measures
of risk in asset management. Often, yield spreads offer investors a clearer picture of the underlying
risk-return trade-offs than the individual yields (interest rates) that are used to construct them. Yield
spreads can be especially informative of the channels through which asset prices affect (or are related
to) the real economy, as their magnitude tends to vary following or anticipating the business cycle.1
As extensively documented in the empirical literature, many spreads tend to suddenly spike at times of
financial distress.2 Consequently, understanding the dynamics of risk and of the risk premia incorporated
in the prices of bonds and in the corresponding spreads has practical implications for policymakers,
finance practitioners, and investors. The ability to identify the particular market segments in which risk
premia exhibit unstable dynamic behavior at times of crisis may allow policy makers to better target
and calibrate their interventions, and may complement traditional early-warning indicators of impending
recessions (Huang et al., 2017). By possibly understanding and forecasting how such unstable dynamics
may migrate across markets and sectors of the economy, policymakers would be able to evaluate the
degree of insulation of individual markets from aggregate and systemic shocks. Moreover, changes in
the evolution of risk premia may suggest to investors alternative diversification approaches. All these
considerations explain the recent interest of economists, econometricians, and applied mathematicians in
forecasting the dynamics of yield spreads.
Animated by such considerations, we describe a recent statistical methodology that can be used to
detect unstable dynamics in a time series of interest and to statistically test the occurrence of migration
of these dynamics from a time series to another. As an application, we propose an empirical exercise
characterized by a twofold objective: (i) the identification of the segments in the U.S. fixed income
markets that were the core ground of the Great Financial Crisis – i.e., the segments where financial
distress appeared first; and (ii) the description of how the 2007 financial turmoil developed and spread
across markets in the subsequent two years. We do so by examining the weekly time series of eight yield
spreads derived from a variety of risky instruments traded in U.S. fixed income markets – which we treat
1Gourio (2014) shows that there is a high correlation between bond spreads and real investments. Faust et al. (2013)
report that some credit spreads improve the forecast accuracy of real-time economic activity. Hollander and Liu (2016)
document significant widening of several credit spreads during the most recent U.S. recessions. Recchioni and Tedeschi
(2017) discuss the relationship between government bond yields and the macroeconomy. Fanelli (2017) shows the relevance
of credit spreads volatilities for interest rate curve modeling and asset pricing.
2See Muir (2017) and Krishnamurty and Muir (2017) for a cross-country perspective, and Guidolin and Tam (2013) for
a specific view on the Great Financial Crisis in the U.S.
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as distinct asset classes – between the second half of 2002 and April 2018. The traded yields include the
3-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on unsecured deposits, the 3-month unsecured financial
and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) rate, the 1-year yield on adjustable-rate mortgages (1-year
ARM), the 5-year 5/1 hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (5-year ARM), the 5-year Aaa private-label
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) rate, the yields on 20-year Moody’s Baa-rated and Aaa-
rated corporate bonds, the 20-year Bloomberg Fair Value U.S. Dollar Composite Bbb-rated and Aa-rated
corporate bond rates, and the 30-year conventional fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities (MBS) yield.
Considering the relevance of the U.S. mortgage market in the 2007-09 crisis (Gorton, 2009a), we include
four series from which mortgage-related risk premia are typically constructed. Given that each spread
is derived as the difference of two yields of the same maturity (3 months; 1, 5, 20, and 30 years), risk
premia associated with mismatched durations of the underlying assets are not embedded in the dataset.
This paper builds upon two strands of literature. The first strand consists of recent empirical work
conducted on U.S. yield spreads and their relation with macroeconomic fluctuations (see, for example,
Guidolin and Tam, 2013; Contessi et al., 2014; Hollander and Liu, 2016; Del Negro et al., 2017; Clark and
Baccar, 2018). The second strand relates to research on optimal methods developed to detect episodes
of contagion and/or bubbles in asset price data and to studies about their transmission across sectors,
industries, or economies (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2001, 2002; Dungey et al., 2005; Pesaran and Pick, 2007;
Hayford and Malliaris, 2005; Longstaff, 2010; Ku¨ru¨m et al., 2018).3 From a methodological perspective,
most of the literature about contagion is based on the application of a range of statistical techniques that
are built upon the analysis of first and second conditional moments. As we describe later, we outline and
then apply a near-explosive detection algorithm which, on the contrary, is founded on the analysis of tail
behavior in the distribution of a variables of interest which offers interesting operational research insights.
Furthermore, most applications of related techniques have focused on stock markets and real estate data
as, for example, in Longstaff (2010) and Phillips and Yu (2011). Our work is, instead, related to fixed
income markets. The set of yield spreads that, despite some significant data limitations, we select is as
representative as possible of the many segments of this part of the U.S. financial system. After detecting
distress episodes, we explore phenomena of contagion and transmission that are crucial to understand
the spread of the 2007-09 Great Financial Crisis.
We adopt a testing and date-stamping technique, initially formulated by Phillips and Yu (2011) and
3There are interesting attempts at merging the two strands of literature. For instance, Recchioni and Tedeschi (2017)
develop a simple and analytically tractable common stochastic, mean-reverting volatility model in continuous time that
captures yield dynamics. They exploit the empirically high correlation between the estimated volatility parameters and the
instability in bond yields to build an early-warning indicator of significant instabilities, similar in spirit to what we apply in
our work. They report that their indicator identifies three bubbles that anticipate three major episodes of instability – i.e.,
the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the European sovereign debt crisis.
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later refined in Phillips et al. (2015), to identify the periods over which the eight yield spreads in our
sample exhibit unstable dynamics – i.e., what we shall formally define as mildly explosive behavior. From
a statistical point of view, this approach is based on detecting variations in the recursive, rolling right-tail
implementation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF ) unit root test by which, under the alternative
hypothesis, the time-series process under investigation exhibits (at least locally) a root larger than one.
In its original formulation, such a testing algorithm allows for the detection (and the date-stamping of
both origination and termination) of bubbles in the time series of the prices of an asset of interest. For
example, Phillips and Yu (2011) interpret the Baa-Aaa corporate yield spread as a measure of the price
of risk in bond markets. To the extent to which this interpretation is reasonable, a period of mildly
explosive behavior in the time series of such a spread, if associated with a widening spread, can be viewed
as a bubble in the price of the underlying market. Also depending on the specific context of application,
this strategy can be used to identify episodes of exuberance and impending collapse, as well as structural
breaks, periods of regime change, or instances of panic and turmoil in a given market.
A comprehensive examination of how the different segments of U.S. fixed income markets have been
affected by distress and of its evolution is still missing. In the application that we propose, our prior
expectation is to find widespread evidence of turbulence and contagion in such markets, especially during
the most recent financial crisis. However, apart from specific channels, such as those linking the asset-
backed securities market to the general financial system, as in Longstaff (2010), the exact identification of
such a connection has proven elusive. We show that the mildly explosive behavior that we detect in the
yield spreads in our sample, especially in the sub-samples in which the spreads exhibit an upward-sloping
trajectory, corresponds to well-known episodes of turmoil in U.S. markets, which therefore – using the
techniques illustrated in this paper – could have been detected, monitored, and partially predicted in real
time (see Huang et al., 2017). Additionally, we find evidence of mildly explosive behavior in six out of
the eight yield spreads under investigation. Two of these six spreads are short/medium-term mortgage-
related spreads. We demonstrate that the strength of such unstable dynamics peaked between August
2007 and January 2009 and occurred, sequentially, first in short-term funding and later in medium- and
long-term markets, which represents a clear and plausible migration pattern.
Furthermore, we formally investigate the conjecture, originally proposed by Gorton (2009a,b), that
the collapse of the synthetic collateralized debt market based on sub-prime residential mortgages could
have been one of the main reaction chambers of the Great Financial Crisis – i.e., the epicenter of a
panic/turmoil episode that triggered a chain reaction that spread across U.S. fixed income markets.4
4Some recent literature in financial economics has investigated contagion and systemic risk with applications to bond
yields (see Recchioni and Tedeschi, 2017) and the European sovereign debt crisis (see Guidolin and Pedio, 2017).
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We use statistical methods to explore the possibility that the financial panic of 2007 initially migrated
from specific segments of the market for sharing and allocating (correlation) risks in sub-prime loans
(through the trading of ABX indices) to other fixed income markets. Seen through the lens of a model of
bank/financial runs with sunspot equilibria, the drop in the ABX indices that occurred in 2007 may have
acted as a focal shock that favored the emergence of a (shadow) bank-run equilibrium consistent with
the financial run mechanism described in Diamond and Dybig (1983). We provide statistical support to
Gorton (2009a,b)’s conjecture through the identification of a panic transmission pattern that goes from
the market of sub-prime residential mortgages to some other key U.S. fixed income yields.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical methodologies. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 discusses empirical application and results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Research Methodologies
Failing to recognize unstable dynamics in time-series data, in real, or almost real, time, has potentially
serious implications for both policy making and investment strategies. Despite the frequent discussions
on the difficulties in the identification of asset bubbles (Bernanke, 2002), policy makers often advocate
increasing interest rates to curb excessive growth of asset prices or, more generally, to prevent financial
instability (Esther, 2016). In fact, since the Great Financial Crisis, several central banks followed the lead
of the Federal Reserve and started developing systems of monitoring for financial markets, as documented
in Adrian et al. (2015). Despite the fact that the identification of bubbles is, in general, not an easy task to
accomplish, the recent studies that we follow have developed tests for the empirical detection of bubbles
in price data based on a combination of theoretical predictions and time-series estimation techniques.
Derived from asset pricing theory, their main idea is that, if a bubble develops in an asset market, prices
should inherit and exhibit, at least locally and for a limited time, an explosive dynamic behavior.
Bubble detection strategies are recently described, for example, in Phillips and Yu (2011) and Phillips
et al. (2015). Their econometric methodology can detect bubbles in the data and date-stamp their
occurrence. Their tests use recursive and rolling right-tail variations of the ADF unit root test in which,
under the null hypothesis, the time series of interest has a unit root and, under the alternative hypothesis,
the observed time series has, at least locally, a root larger than one – i.e., technically, it is a mildly
explosive stochastic process. If the null hypothesis of their tests is rejected, one can then estimate the
origination and termination of a bubble or of multiple bubbles. Phillips et al. (2015) show that a specific
version of their procedure (based on recursive and flexible windows) can be used, under general regularity
conditions, as a date-stamping strategy able to consistently estimate the origination and termination of
4
bubbles in long historical time series. Through Monte Carlo simulations, they demonstrate that their
strategy outperforms the approach initially proposed in Phillips and Yu (2011). In particular, they argue
that their test significantly improves the discriminatory power and leads to non-negligible power gains
when multiple bubbles are present in the data. The bubble detection algorithm is complemented by a test
of transmission of mild explosiveness across time series based on a simple regression analysis framework.
These statistical tools offer at least two advantages. First, unlike alternative techniques, they are able
to detect the occurrence of multiple bubbles, potentially in real time, as distress unfolds in a given market.
Second, at least to some extent, they help better understand the causal dynamics across yields through
an empirical analysis. In principle, only theoretical models and/or solid economic reasoning can provide
a justification for any conjectured direction of causality between (pairs of) variables and inform empirical
testing strategies of causality links. In our application, we face a scarcity of detailed theoretical models,
but we can refer to a vast empirical literature that – with reference to the Great Financial Crisis – has
isolated in a few specific fixed income markets (e.g., subprime asset-backed securities and junk corporate
bonds) the origins of the severe and pervasive market impairments between 2007 and 2009. One can see
our empirical investigation as a rigorous, statistically grounded testing exercise for a number of claims
that had been previously made about the origins of the 2007-09 market panic (see Gorton, 2009a,b).
Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the procedure that we adopt to (i) detect and date-stamp periods of
mildly explosive behavior in the yield spreads in the sample and (ii) to describe its transmission across
markets. Specific details are given in the following subsections.
2.1 Testing for the Presence of Mildly Explosive Behavior
The first step of the procedure is a test used to detect mild explosiveness in a time series of interest, yt.
(a) The testing strategy is based on the estimation of the following reduced-form equation,
yt = µ+ δyt−1 +
p∑
i=1
φi∆yt−i + εt, (1)
where µ is an intercept, p is the maximum number of lags, and εt is the error term.
(b) We follow Phillips et al. (2015) and consider the hypotheses, H0 : δ = 1 vs H1 : δ > 1. We normalize
the original sample interval of T observations to the compact [0, 1]. The δ coefficient, estimated
by ordinary least squares over the (normalized) sample [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, 1], and its corresponding ADF
test statistic are denoted by δr1,r2 and ADFr1,r2 , respectively. We define the (fractional) window
size of the regression as rw = r2 − r1. The Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(GSADF ) test is derived from a recursive procedure in which the ADF test statistic is calculated
over (overlapping) rolling windows of increasing sizes and moving starting points (i.e., over a forward
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rolling and expanding sample). Each estimation in this recursive approach produces an ADF test
statistic. The GSADF test statistic is the supremum ADFr1,r2 statistic over all possible windows,
GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
{ADFr1,r2} , (2)
where r0 is the smallest sample window width fraction (which initializes the computation of the test
statistic, in our paper set to 10%) and 1 is the largest window width fraction (corresponding to the
full sample size) in the recursion. The recursion mechanism is represented graphically in Figure 2.
(c) The relevant critical values are then simulated as follows. We generate a random sample of T
observations based on a null model, which, as in Phillips et al. (2015), is a random walk process
with an asymptotically negligible drift and a normal error term, et,
yt = dT
−η + θyt−1 + et, et ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
, θ = d = η = 1, (3)
where η is a localizing coefficient that controls the magnitude of the drift as T −→∞.
(d) Using the recursion that we describe in Figure 2, we estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares
over the sample generated by the null model, and then store the resulting GSADF test statistic.
(e) We repeat first and second steps 1, 000 times.
(f) We calculate the 90% quantile of the distribution of the GSADF test statistic produced from these
1,000 simulations. This quantile is used to test the null of a unit root against the alternative of a
mildly explosive process. The simulation output includes the p-value for the computed test statistic,
p (τ̂) =
1
1, 000
1,000∑
j=1
I (τj > τ̂) , (4)
where τ̂ is the sample GSADF test statistic, I (·) is an indicator function such that
I (τj > τ̂) =
 1 if τj > τ̂0 if τj 6 τ̂ , (5)
and {τj}1,000j=1 is the sequence of simulated GSADF test statistics.
2.2 Date-Stamping Periods of Mildly Explosive Behavior
The procedure outlined in Figure 1 then proceeds to date-stamp periods of mildly explosive behavior.
(g) If the null hypothesis of the GSADF test is rejected, a similar procedure as in the previous subsec-
tion can be used, under general regularity conditions, as a date-stamping strategy to consistently
estimate origination and termination of periods of mildly explosive behavior. We implement a re-
cursive Supremum ADF test on backward expanding samples, using an algorithm specular to the
one that we have described in the previous subsection. The end point, which now moves backwards,
of each sample is fixed at r2 and the start point is allowed to vary from 0 to r2− r0. For each r2, we
obtain a sequence of ADF test statistics, {ADFr1,r2}r1∈[0,r2−r0], and a Backward Supremum ADF
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test statistic, defined as the supremum value of the ADF test statistic sequence over this interval,
BSADFr2 (r0) = sup
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
{ADFr1,r2} . (6)
(h) Based on the sequence of test statistics, estimates of beginning (r̂e) and termination (r̂f ) of a period
of mildly explosive behavior (as fractions of the full sample) are given by
r̂e = inf
r2∈[0,1]
{
r2 : BSADFr2 (r0) > cv
βT
r2
}
(7)
and
r̂f = inf
r2∈[r̂e,1]
{
r2 : BSADFr2 (r0) < cv
βT
r2
}
, (8)
where cvβTr2 is the 100 (1− βT ) % critical value of the BSADF test statistic based on Tr2 obser-
vations and βT is a real number between 0 and 1 indicating the level of significance of the test.
In other words, the origination date is the observation at which the BSADF statistic exceeds the
critical value of the BSADF statistic. Similarly, the termination date is the observation at which
the BSADF statistic falls below the critical value of the BSADF statistic. The GSADF test and
the BSADF test statistics are related to each other – i.e.,
GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
{BSADFr2 (r0)} . (9)
2.3 Migration of Mildly Explosive Behavior
The steps in Figure 1 are finally completed here. The reduced-form algorithm to test migration of mildly
explosive behavior from one series Xt to another series Yt is originally described in Phillips and Yu (2011).
(i) Let θX (τ) be the coefficient of an autoregressive model with an intercept term, for the time series
{Xt}τ=Trt=1 with r ∈ [r0, 1]. θX (τ) can be estimated by ordinary least squares as θ̂X (τ) over a
recursively increasing window with a fixed starting date that occurs as early as practically feasible
in the sample. We define θY (τ) and θ̂Y (τ) similarly. By allowing for time variation in θX (τ), we
try to capture possible structural changes in the coefficient(s) originating from episodes of turmoil,
panic, or market exuberance. Our goal is to test the presence of migratory effects in the dynamics
of a second time series, Yt. The intuition is that, when mild explosiveness reaches its peak in Xt (a
local maximum in the sequence of BSADF test statistics), we can test for its transmission to Yt.
Under the alternative of migration, mildly explosive behavior emerges in Yt as it fades away in Xt.
From a modeling point of view, the null generating mechanism of Yt has a recursive autoregressive
coefficient, θY (τ), that transitions from a unit root to a mildly explosive root and that is negatively
associated with the corresponding recursive autoregressive coefficient for Xt, θX (τ).
(j) Suppose that the date-stamping procedure that we have described has identified mildly explosive
behavior in Xt between τ̂eX = T r̂eX and τ̂fX = T r̂fX and in Yt between τ̂eY = T r̂eY and τ̂fY =
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T r̂fY . Also assume that the two sequences of BSADF statistics for Xt and Yt peak at times
τ̂ρX = T r̂ρX and τ̂ρY = T r̂ρY , respectively, and that r̂ρY > r̂ρX . Let m = τ̂ρY − τ̂ρX = T r̂ρY −T r̂ρX
be the number of observations in the interval (τ̂ρX , τ̂ρY ]. Phillips and Yu (2011) show that the
notion of migration that we have described can be detected by first estimating the regression,[
θ̂Y (τ)− 1
]
= β0 + β1
[
θ̂X (τ)− 1
] τ − τ̂ρX
m
+ error, with τ = T r̂ρX + 1, ..., T r̂ρY , (10)
over a sample covering the period of collapse in Xt and the coincident emergence of explosiveness in
Yt, and then by testing H0 : β1 = 0 vs H1 : β1 < 0. An asymptotically conservative and consistent
test for this hypothesis is based on the standard normally distributed test statistic,
Zβ =
β̂1
L (m)
, where
1
L (m)
+
L (m)
T 
−→ 0, as T −→∞ for any  > 0, (11)
for some slowly varying function L (m), such as a log10 (m), with a > 0 and m = O (T ).
3 Data
The empirical methods described in the previous section are applied to the identification of periods of
explosive behavior in the time series in our sample. The objective is to determine the beginning and the
end of episodes of unstable dynamics, and to test for their migration across U.S. fixed income markets,
using data concerning eight interest rate spreads of interest and ABX indices. The series are collected
from Bloomberg and organized in a sample of weekly observations, as typical in the literature. We
consider a sample that spans the period between the week of September 20, 2002 and the week of April
20, 2018, for a total of 814 weekly observations. However, some spreads and the ABX indices cover
different sub-samples, depending on data availability (see Table 1).5
Spread 1 (3-Month LIBOR-OIS): 3-month LIBOR on unsecured deposits relative to the overnight
indexed swap (OIS) rate. The 3-month LIBOR is the interest rate that banks face when they borrow
unsecured funds on the interbank market with a 3-month maturity. The OIS rate is the fixed interest
rate that a bank receives in 3-month swaps between a fixed rate and a compound interest payment on
a notional amount to be determined with reference to the effective federal funds rate. The LIBOR-OIS
spread is widely perceived as an indicator of tensions in money markets, a measure of health of the
banking system, and as an index of risk and liquidity in the money market.
Spread 2 (3-Month ABCP-Treasury): 3-month ABCP relative to Treasury Bills of the same
maturity. ABCP experienced a dramatic drop in transaction volumes during the financial crisis, a shortage
that made this spread particularly reflective of both liquidity and credit risk.
Spread 3 and Spread 4 (1-Year ARM-Treasury and 5-Year ARM-Treasury): 1-year ARM
5An extended description of the data is provided in an online Appendix.
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Average relative to Treasury Bills and 5-year 5/1 Hybrid ARM relative to Treasury Notes, respectively.
They are representative of sub-prime rates charged on mortgage contracts and capture strains more
directly associated to the real estate market. They are proxies of mortgage default risk premia.
Spread 5 (5-Year Aaa Private-Label CMBS-Treasury): 5-year Aaa private-label CMBS rel-
ative to Treasury Bonds. It represents the risk premium on private-label securitized mortgages. In our
paper, it is used to capture the freezing of the underlying spot market between mid-2007 and early 2009
(Gorton, 2009b), partially reversed by the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program.
Spread 6 (20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate): 20-year Moody’s Baa-rated corporate
bonds relative to the Aaa-rated corporate rate. It is a traditional indicator of credit risk, discussed in
the literature also because of its forecasting power for many asset returns (Bianchi and Guidolin, 2014).
Spread 7 (20-Year Bloomberg Fair Value U.S. Dollar Composite Bbb-Aa-Rated Corpo-
rate): 20-year Moody’s Bbb-rated corporate relative to Aa-rated corporate bond yield (a junk spread).
It is similar to Spread 6, but it refers to riskier bonds and was rarely directly affected by policy interven-
tions in the United States. Both Spread 6 and Spread 7 provide information about the cost of funding
for businesses and therefore represent a direct measure of strains in the private non-financial sector.
Spread 8 (30-Year Freddie Mac Conventional Fixed-Rate MBS-Treasury): 30-year Freddie
Mac conventional fixed-rate MBS relative to Treasury Bonds. It captures the credit risk of conventional
mortgage products and is representative of the premium on agency mortgage-backed securities.
Because they are mostly computed from Treasury or corporate yields on assets with low risk, these
spreads reflect credit-risk and (il)liquidity factors in fixed income markets. Thus, the application of our
research design on these spreads allows us to study and characterize any explosive behaviors in the price of
credit risk plus the cost of illiquidity in each market.6 Generally positive and large skewness is associated
with a sizable divergence between mean and median in most spreads. Large excess kurtosis appears in
all spreads, but Spreads 3 and 8. Spreads 1-8 are plotted in the lower panels of Figure 3.
A feature common to all spreads in our dataset is a substantial and synchronized increase approxi-
mately located in the middle of the sample. All spreads peak around September 2008. Such a simultaneous
increase likely depends on a common factor and is, broadly speaking, the reflection of turbulence in fi-
nancial markets, which would later become the Great Financial Crisis. Except for Spread 3, all spreads
remain relatively flat between the beginning of the sample and 2007. Many of them are, in fact, close to
their historical means (Spreads 2, 4, 6, and 7) or generally fluctuate either slightly above (Spread 8) or
slightly below (Spreads 1, 3, and 5) their respective means. All spreads start widening in 2007, during
6For convenience, a synthetic description of each spread is provided in Table C1. Their empirical distributions are reported
in Figure C1. Table C1 and Figure C1 are both available in an online Appendix.
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the initial stages of the Great Financial Crisis, when the economic and financial turmoil only appeared
to affect markets directly connected to the sub-prime real estate industry (see Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2012).
The eight interest rate spreads start rising well before Fall 2008 – i.e., the period often considered (maybe
incorrectly) to mark the official beginning of the Great Financial Crisis. During the crisis, the relative
increases in the spreads versus their pre-crisis levels range wildly. However, proportionally, they tend
to be milder for spreads with longer maturities. As observed in an unreported investigation of several
subperiods, variances and interquartile ranges show remarkable increments during the Great Financial
Crisis and return close to pre-crisis levels in the months after June 2009.
ABX Indices. An ABX index is representative of a credit default swap (CDS) contract that pools
lists of exposures to mortgage-backed securities. The ABX.HE is a set of indices that track credit default
swaps on U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (see Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008; Fender and
Scheicher, 2009; Gorton, 2009a,b, for more detailed discussions). Four groups of ABX indices were issued
every six months between January 2006 and 2008. Each index tracks credit default swaps on a fixed
sample of twenty residential mortgage-backed securities, based on sub-prime mortgages issued in the
previous six months. Each group of indices includes five sub-indices corresponding to different rating
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities, namely AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BBB-. Classes BBB
and BBB- are the ratings for the riskiest sub-prime mortgage loans. As of 2007, these sub-indices became
closely monitored barometers for changes in U.S. sub-prime debt markets and soon came to represent a
focal point for all market participants.7 ABX.HE.06-1 indices are the first issuance of this kind of CDS
and refer to tranches of twenty residential mortgage-backed securities issued in the second half of 2005.
4 Application of the Methodologies and Empirical Results
We apply the methodologies described above to (i) identify periods of mild explosiveness in the eight
yield spreads in the sample; (ii) describe how mild explosiveness migrates from market to market; and
(iii) test the empirical validity of Gorton (2009a,b)’s conjecture.
4.1 Periods of Mild Explosiveness
Table 2 reports the individual outcomes of the recursive right-tail ADF tests. We resort to the Schwartz
Information Criterion to select the optimal lag length in all test regressions. In each case, we allow for a
maximum of 13 lags, – i.e., about three months of weekly observations.8
7We plot these five sub-indices for each group in the four charts of Figure C2 in an online Appendix.
8The time series of Spreads 1 and 2 have the same length in the sample. As such, they share the same simulated critical
values. The same applies to Spreads 3 and 4, as well as Spreads 6 and 8. The tests on Spreads 5 and 7 are based on different
10
We find evidence of mildly explosive behavior in all spreads but Spread 4 (5-Year ARM-Treasury)
and Spread 8 (30-Year Freddie Mac Conventional Fixed-Rate MBS-Treasury). The periods of explosive
dynamics (represented by conventional grey bars) are graphically depicted in Figure 3, in Figure 4, and,
using a slightly different graphical representation, in Figure 5. In the upper panels of Figure 3, we plot
the sequences of spread-specific BSADF test statistics and the corresponding sequences of critical values.
Some of the periods of mild explosiveness that we estimate are associated with generally increasing yield
spreads (i.e., the price of the risky asset is declining relative to the price of the safer asset in the spread);
some other periods are, instead, associated with generally decreasing yield spreads (i.e., the price of the
risky asset is rising relative to the price of the safer asset used to compute the spread). The identified
periods of instability are summarized in Table 3, where we also report an indicator of the general behavior
of each spread – an increasing (I) or decreasing (D) pattern – in each estimated time frame.
To the extent to which it is possible to identify such periods in real time, the information generated
from the detection of mildly explosive behavior might be used to devise optimal investment strategies. For
example, a very simple strategy could be developed along the following lines. When a period of mildly
explosive behavior is detected in a yield spread and that period is associated with a generally rising
spread, a risk-averse investor may take a short position in the risky(ier) leg (bond) of the spread and,
at the same time, a long position in the safe(r) bond. Conversely, when a period of mild explosiveness
occurs as a yield spread declines, a risk-averse investor may want to take a long position in the risky(ier)
bond and a short position in the safe(r) bond of that spread. Of course, any investment strategy should
be formally compared to different and, possibly, more sophisticated approaches in a carefully-structured
empirical exercise. However, this strategy (or variations of it) could prove superior to many alternatives
in several circumstances, as verified, for instance, in Milunovich et al. (2019) in their study of how to use
bubble date-stamping techniques to design trading strategies applied to sectoral U.S. equity indices.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the individual interest rates from which the yield spreads in the sample
are derived. The peaks of instability in the dynamics of each spread, which occur in correspondence of the
global maxima in the sequences of BSADF test statistics, all appear in periods during which yield spreads
tend to increase, as emphasized in Figure 5: August 31, 2007 (Spread 1, 3-Month LIBOR-OIS); October
19, 2007 (Spread 2, 3-Month ABCP-Treasury); March 21, 2008 (Spread 3, 1-Year ARM-Treasury); March
7, 2008 (Spread 5, 5-Year Aaa Private-Label CMBS-Treasury); November 21, 2008 (Spread 6, 20-Year
Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate); and December 19, 2008 (Spread 7, 20-Year Moody’s Bbb-Aa-Rated
Corporate). In other words, unstable dynamics peak in the U.S. fixed income markets between August
2007 and December 2008. These peaks move sequentially from short-term funding markets to medium-
and spread-specific critical values, as their corresponding time series span shorter periods of time.
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and long-term markets during the crisis period. Note that peaks of instability as we have defined them
and peaks in the levels of the yield spreads do not have to (and, in fact, do not) correspond.
According to Contessi et al. (2014), the Great Financial Crisis started in the summer of 2007 (during
the week ending on August 3, 2007) and ended in the early summer of 2009 (during the week ending on
June 26, 2009). Concordance between the appearance of explosive dynamics associated with generally
rising spreads (around July/August 2007) and the initial period of the crisis is evident in the cases of
Spreads 1, 2, 3, and 5 – i.e., the short- and medium-term spreads. Such episodes of statistically unstable
dynamics in these spreads can possibly be seen as evidence of distress in the underlying markets. Isolated
spells of explosive behavior associated with generally decreasing spreads are also detected, for prolonged
periods, between 2004 and 2006 and between 2010 and 2012, at least as far as Spread 3 (1-Year ARM-
Treasury) is concerned. Furthermore, short periods of quick or sudden adjustment are found during the
first halves of 2004 and 2015 in Spread 6 (20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate).
The empirical methodology seems to identify the beginning of the financial crisis in the summer of
2007, when the 3-Month LIBOR-OIS spread (Spread 1) experienced a large increase. Brigo et al. (2017)
point out that, prior to the financial crisis, institutions used to ignore the credit risk of highly-rated
counterparties in valuing and hedging contingent claims traded over-the-counter (OTC). However, when
this specific, explosive bout of the crisis hit (i.e., the sudden increase in the LIBOR-OIS spread), dealers
and financial institutions immediately reassessed the valuation of OTC claims and readjusted their book
values, as a consequence of the spiking credit and liquidity risk in the interbank market. Incidentally, in
June and July 2007, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Services downgraded over a hundred bonds
backed by second-lien sub-prime mortgages, and later put 612 securities backed by sub-prime residential
mortgages on a credit watch. Around the same time, Bear Stearns informed investors that it would
suspend redemptions from its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. At
the end of July, Countrywide Financial Corporation filed a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
warning signaling “difficult conditions” and Bear Stearns liquidated two hedge funds that had invested
in various types of mortgage-backed securities. These events, which caused turmoil in financial markets,
correspond to the first episode of mild explosiveness identified in Spread 1. The following episode of
disruption in the 3-Month LIBOR-OIS spread occurs between September 19, 2008 and November 14,
2008, a period characterized by the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers and the first massive wave
of U.S. government interventions in the form of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a program
to purchase toxic assets from financial institutions to bolster the financial sector. A third episode of
mildly explosive behavior in Spread 1, again associated with a generally increasing spread, is found more
recently, between the end of July 2016 and the end of October of the same year.
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Our date-stamping technique captures a spell of disruption and mildly explosive behavior between
August 17, 2007 and March 14, 2008 in the time series of the second short-term spread in the sample
(Spread 2, or 3-Month ABCP-Treasury spread). Fitch Ratings downgraded Countrywide Financial Cor-
poration to BBB+ on August 16, 2007. By that time, Countrywide had entirely borrowed the $11.5
billion available in credit lines with other banks. During the same week, the Federal Reserve Board
voted to reduce the primary credit rate by 50 basis points to 5.75%, thus narrowing the difference with
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)’s federal funds rate target to only 50 basis points. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve also increased the maximum term of the primary credit bor-
rowing to 30 days, in a move to facilitate access to liquidity by qualifying banks. Despite the fact that
the date-stamping technique formally limits the mildly explosive behavior in Spread 2 to the middle of
March 2008, a visual inspection of the yields that we use to construct it (Figure 4) suggests that the
adjustment period in the underlying markets might have, instead, ended much later, in mid-2009. In
fact, as Figure 3 shows, the sequence of BSADF test statistics for Spread 2 exceeds the corresponding
sequence of critical values between the end of 2008 and the first half of 2009, a period during which the
spread is particularly large. However, the BSADF statistic fails to remain above the sequence of critical
values for long enough to allow a formal detection of explosiveness, which, instead, appears again between
August 12, 2016 and October 7, 2016. Incidentally, this last spell of mildly explosive behavior in Spread
2 is basically coincident with the last spell detected in Spread 1.
Two of the three spreads that most accurately track the short/medium-term economic dynamics in
the real estate market (Spreads 3, 4, and 5) are affected by several episodes of turbulence. The 1-Year
ARM-Treasury spread (Spread 3) exhibits one long episode of explosive behavior associated with an
upward-sloping trajectory. This episode covers the entire period of turmoil in the housing market, as it
starts in mid-August 2007 and ends in the second half of January 2010. Three spells of explosive behavior
associated with a downward-sloping time evolution of Spread 3 are also detected. First, we identify the
period between September 24, 2004 and March 24, 2006, which is characterized by progressive increases
in the Federal Funds Rate.9 The evolution of Spread 3 over this time frame is consistent with the general
behavior of financial variables during development of the housing bubble. Levitin and Wachter (2012) and
Justiniano et al. (2017) argue that a disproportionate increase in the supply of housing finance between
2004 and 2006 kept mortgage interest rates particularly low relative to their risk and to other interest
rates, such as those associated with safe assets. Second, we find mild explosiveness in the periods June 25,
2010 - July 29, 2011 and February 24, 2012 - March 9, 2012. Arguably, given that Spread 3, on average,
9The Federal Reserve began raising the target policy rate in the fall of 2004, after a prolonged period of accommodating
monetary policy that followed the recession of 2001.
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fell during these two time periods, such dynamics can be interpreted as sharp adjustment following the
Great Financial Crisis. In particular, the beginning of the period from June 2010 to July 2011 occurs
just a few months after the Federal Reserve Board increased slightly the discount rate from 0.5% to
0.75%, shortened the maximum maturity for discount window loans, and, citing continued improvement
in financial market conditions, held its final Term Auction Facility (TAF) auction (March 8, 2010).10
The date-stamping algorithm also identifies a period of turbulence in the market of commercial
mortgage-backed securities, represented in our sample by Spread 5 – i.e., the 5-Year Aaa private-label
CMBS-Treasury spread. The period covering the spell of mild explosiveness that we estimate (July 20,
2007 - March 27, 2009) is associated with a long and persistent spread increase. Mild explosiveness also
characterizes the 20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate spread (Spread 6) during a short spell in
the first half of 2004. These weeks are associated with a generally downward-sloping trajectory of Spread
6. Furthermore, mildly explosive behavior is detected in Spread 6 during a long period associated with an
increasing spread, between March 7, 2008 (just before the collapse of Bear Stearns) and April 10, 2009,
which is approximately at the end of the overall disruption in funding markets. More recently, spells of
mildly explosive dynamics are detected at the beginning of 2015, a period during which Spread 6 tends
to decrease; and between July 2015 and March 2016, a period during which Spread 6 tends to rise.
Spread 7 (20-Year BFV USD Bbb-Aa-Rated Corporate, or junk, spread) starts exhibiting instability
around the end of 2008, arguably at the peak of the financial crisis, after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, as the financial panic spread from interbank markets and the shadow banking system to the
funding markets for corporations – i.e., to the “real economy.” In the case of this spread, short periods
of turbulence are also found between April and May 2015 and in June 2011.
While we fail to detect any mildly explosive behavior in Spread 4 (5-Year ARM-Treasury) and Spread 8
(30-Year Freddie Mac Conventional Fixed-Rate MBS-Treasury), (i) the sequence ofBSADF test statistics
for Spread 4 exceeds the appropriate sequence of critical values between the summer of 2007 and the
beginning of 2009; and (ii) the sequence of BSADF test statistics for Spread 8 exceeds critical values
between the beginning of 2005 and the beginning of 2006. In both cases, these periods are associated
with generally rising yield spreads. See Figure 3 for details.
10Under the TAF, the Federal Reserve auctioned term funds to depository institutions that were already eligible to borrow
under the primary credit program. All advances were fully collateralized. Each TAF auction was for a fixed amount with a
rate to be determined through the auction process, subject to a minimum bid rate.
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4.2 Migration of Mild Explosiveness
We investigate the possibility of migration of explosive behavior from market to market, from a peak
of instability to another, by implementing the testing strategy discussed in Section 2. All results are
reported in Table 4. The global peaks in the sequences of BSADF statistics for each individual spread
are reported in the notes underneath the table. We do not report a global peak for Spread 4 (5-Year
ARM-Treasury) nor for Spread 8 (30-Year Freddie Mac Conventional Fixed-Rate MBS-Treasury), given
that, in these two cases, we fail to detect any statistically significant explosive behavior. Based on the
previously described chronological appearance of these peaks, we test for migration from Spread 1 (3-
Month LIBOR-OIS) to Spreads 2-3 and 5-7, for migration from Spread 2 (3-Month ABCP-Treasury) to
Spreads 3 and 5-7, for migration from Spread 3 (1-Year ARM-Treasury) to Spreads 6-7, for migration
from Spread 5 (5-Year Aaa Private-Label CMBS-Treasury) to Spreads 3 and 6-7, and for migration from
Spread 6 (20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate) to Spread 7. Variable m in the table represents
the number of weekly observations between the peak in the sequence of BSADF test statistics for the
spread from which we conjecture migration and the peak in the sequence of BSADF statistics for the
spread towards which migration might be occurring.11 Starting from the fourth column in the table,
we report (i) the estimated slope coefficient of each test regression (as described in Section 2.3), (ii) the
associated standard error and t-statistic, and (iii) the numerical value of L (m) and Zβ computed for
different values of the parameter a, here allowed to vary discretely between 1/10 and 1/3.
We detect statistically significant migration from Spread 1 (3-Month LIBOR-OIS) to Spread 3 (1-
Year ARM-Treasury) and Spread 5 (5-Year Aaa Private-Label CMBS-Treasury); and from Spread 2
(3-Month ABCP-Treasury) to Spread 3 (1-Year ARM-Treasury), Spread 5 (5-Year Aaa Private-Label
CMBS-Treasury), Spread 6 (20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate), and Spread 7 (20-Year BFV
USD Bbb-Aa-Rated Corporate). These findings support the notion that the tensions and turmoil that
emerged in the short-term funding markets in the second half of 2007 transmitted to the medium- and
long-term real estate derivatives market and corporate junk bond market as the financial crisis unfolded.
This evidence is consistent with the patterns in the peaks of instability described early on, as they occur
sequentially and move from short-term funding markets to medium- and long-term markets between
August 2007 and December 2008, arguably the most turbulent months of the Great Financial Crisis.
11When we test for migration from Spread 1 to Spread 2, from Spread 5 to Spread 3, and from Spread 6 to Spread 7, m
is likely too small (equal to 7, 2, and 4, respectively) to produce meaningfully estimated test regression coefficients.
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4.3 The Panic of 2007 Revisited
We investigate Gorton (2009a,b)’s conjecture that the collapse of the ABX indices in 2007 triggered a
reaction in other U.S. financial markets, including fixed income markets. Such a reaction was likely
determined by a signaling mechanism about the state of the market of mortgage-backed securities. We
test for the migration of financial distress from the ABX to fixed income markets using data from the first
roll of ABX indices, which provides the longest time series. In particular, we apply the testing algorithm
only on the BBB index, namely the ABX.HE.BBB.06-1 series. As explained in Section 2, the application
of the recursive methodology requires an initial window of observations to initialize the algorithm. As we
use a 10% initial window and given that the index data only span a period from the week of January 19,
2006 through the week of May 15, 2015 (488 observations), the implementation of the technique would
consume weekly ABX.HE.BBB.06-1 index data well through the second half of 2007. For such index, we
then collect daily data between January 19, 2006 and May 18, 2015 (a total of 2,321 observations), apply
the right-tail ADF test, and find significant evidence of mildly explosive behavior at the 1% level. When
the index starts collapsing at the beginning of 2007, mild explosiveness peaks for the first time (a local
maximum of 6.685 in the sequence of BSADF test statistics) on February 12, 2007 and for the second
time (a local maximum of 7.242, the third largest in the sample,) just a few months later, on July 26,
2007. The days that Gorton (2009a) identifies as the beginning of the panic in the ABX market are also
located in the last week of July 2007. Therefore, we use this initial week to test for panic transmission.
Going back to weekly series, we test for panic transmission to the fixed income markets represented by
the yield spreads that exhibit peaks in the sequence of BSADF statistics after the week of July 27, 2007.
Empirical findings (Table 5) show evidence of transmission from the ABX.HE.BBB.06-1 index to Spreads
2, 5, 6, and 7 (maybe Spread 1, too), thus statistically validating Gorton (2009a,b)’s argument. Instability
transmitted directly to short and medium/long segments of U.S. fixed income markets, including some
of the mortgage-related and risky corporate bond markets in the sample. Panic and a mechanism of
propagation are, therefore, formally detected at the onset of the Great Financial Crisis.
In an online Appendix, we sketch the details and results of an alternative test of transmission from
ABX markets to fixed income markets based on the battery of Granger causality tests implemented
in Longstaff (2010). We argue that the main advantage of the approach that we present is that we
are able to eliminate most arbitrariness from the empirical investigation. The samples over which we
test transmission and contagion, unlike Longstaff (2010), are endogenously and clearly determined by
a recursive methodology. More specifically, (i) we search for mildly explosive behavior in a set of time
series and explore to what extent such behavior sequentially migrates from a time series to another; (ii)
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the technique that we use is concerned with and analyzes the tail behavior in the distribution of relevant
statistical quantities; (iii) in the framework that we describe, contagion and transmission are notions
related to how tail behaviors in the distributions of two or more time series are associated to each other;
(iv) a Granger causality test fails to reflect tail behavior; rather, it can only give information as to whether
conditional means are associated to each other.
5 Conclusions
This study contributes to the understanding of the time-series behavior of yield spreads in U.S. fixed
income markets between 2002 and 2018. We give special emphasis to the turbulent years of the Great
Financial Crisis. Using U.S. weekly data, we construct a panel of eight spreads from a variety of traded
instruments and yields and identify periods of mildly explosive behavior in their dynamics. Six out
of these eight spreads are characterized by spells of statistically significant mild explosiveness, which,
depending on the context, can be interpreted either as periods of financial turmoil and distress or periods
of quick readjustment and shock absorption. As a matter of fact, from a temporal point of view, the
spells that we identify exhibit noticeable concordance with the timeline of the Great Financial Crisis of
2007-09.12 Such dating consistency is particularly evident in the case of short-term spreads and in the
case of those spreads in the sample that, more specifically, capture the risk(s) associated with the U.S.
real estate market. We also find evidence of statistical instability (possibly financial or economic distress)
and migration of such instability across markets. During the Great Financial Crisis, mildly explosive
dynamics migrate from markets associated with short-term funding to markets represented by spreads
implicit in medium- and long-term fixed income securities.
Moreover, we investigate Gorton (2009a,b)’s conjecture that ABX indices may have provided critical
information about the development of real estate markets just before the beginning of the crisis in 2007
and that this information may have triggered a panic that spread across financial markets. We test for
migration from a spell of mildly explosive behavior in the ABX market to the segments of fixed income
markets represented by the yield spreads in our sample. Indeed, between July 2007 and December
2008, we find statistical evidence of instability migration towards the markets that have been found to
be affected by spells of mild explosiveness. This finding suggests that there probably exist avenues of
migration of financial distress that might be amenable to policy intervention, at least to the extent to
which that distress could be detected early in the data, as the described methods offer a promise to.
Of course, avenues of further extension of both methods and application would be fruitful and deserve
12See, for example, https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline.
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careful exploration. In this paper, we have looked for evidence of explosiveness in the time series of yield
spreads. Statistical moments are affected, in case explosive dynamics actually occur, but we have not
paid any specific attention to the informational content of, for example, conditional volatilities. Although,
statistically, mild explosiveness will also be reflected in the dynamics of volatility, volatility may, by itself,
contain useful and additional early-warning information that could be optimally exploited. For instance,
Recchioni and Tedeschi (2017) note that in their multivariate, common stochastic volatility model there is
a strong correlation between estimated volatilities and instability in government bond yields. This finding
might provide the basis fo the construction of an early-warning indicator of significant instabilities that
complements the one that we adopt in this paper. Ku¨ru¨m et al. (2018) combine a number of mathematical
tools to generate early-warning signals of financial bubbles that exploit trading volume data. They show
that their index effectively declines as a bubble-burst moment approaches. In this paper, we have ignored
volume data altogether, but it would be interesting to extend our analysis in this direction.
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Description of Yield Spreads
Variable Upper Yield Description Lower Yield Description Sample
Number of
Weekly 
Observations
Spread 1 3-Month LIBOR 3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate: 
Based on U.S. $
3-Month OIS 3-Month U.S. Overnight Index Swap 09/20/2002 - 04/20/2018 814
Spread 2 3-Month ABCP 90-Day AA Unsecured Financial Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper
3-Month T-bill 3-Month Treasury Bond Yield 09/20/2002 - 04/20/2018 814
Spread 3 1-Year ARM 1-Year Adjustable Rate Mortgage Average in 
the United States (Discontinued on 
01/01/2016)
1-Year T-bill 1-Year Treasury Note Yield at Constant 
Maturity
09/20/2002 - 01/01/2016 694
Spread 4 5-Year ARM 5/1 Hybrid Adjustable Rate Mortgages: U.S. 5-Year Treasury 5-Year Treasury Note Yield at Constant 
Maturity
01/07/2005 - 04/20/2018 694
Spread 5 5-Year Aaa Private-Label 
CMBS
Morgan Stanley U.S. Fixed Rate CMBS 
Conduit Aaa Avg Life 5-Year (Discontinued 
on 07/19/2013)
5-Year Treasury 5-Year Treasury Note Yield at Constant 
Maturity
09/20/2002 - 07/19/2013 566
Spread 6 20-Year Moody's Baa-
Rated Corporate
Moody's Baa Corporate Bonds Yields, Based 
on Corporate Bonds with Remaining 
Maturities of at Least 20 Years 
(Discontinued on 10/07/2016)
20-Year Moody's Aaa-
Rated Corporate
Moody's Aaa Corporate Bonds Yields, Based 
on Corporate Bonds with Remaining 
Maturities of at Least 20 Years 
(Discontinued on 10/07/2016)
09/20/2002 - 10/07/2016 734
Spread 7 20-Year Bloomberg Fair 
Value U.S. Dollar 
Composite Bbb-Rated 
Corporate
BFV USD Composite Bbb 20 Year 20-Year Bloomberg Fair 
Value U.S. Dollar 
Composite Aa-Rated 
Corporate
BFV USD Composite Aa 20 Year 
(Discontinued on 03/30/2012)
09/20/2002 - 03/30/2012 498
Spread 8 30-Year Freddie Mac 
Conventional Fixed-Rate 
MBS
Contract Interest Rates on Commitments for 
Fixed-Rate 30-Year Mortgages 
(Discontinued on 10/07/2016)
30-Year Treasury 30-Year Treasury Note Yield at Constant 
Maturity
09/20/2002 - 10/07/2016 734
Notes. In this table, we describe how each spread is constructed and also provide spread-specific sample information.
Each spread is derived as the difference between an upper yield and a lower yield.
21
T
ab
le
2:
R
ig
h
t-
T
ai
l
A
u
gm
en
te
d
D
ic
k
ey
-F
u
ll
er
(A
D
F
)
T
es
ts
S
pr
ea
d
G
S
A
D
F
 T
es
t S
ta
ti
st
ic
S
am
pl
e
S
iz
e 
of
 T
es
t
C
ri
ti
ca
l V
al
ue
s
S
pr
ea
ds
 1
 a
nd
 2
C
ri
ti
ca
l V
al
ue
s
S
pr
ea
ds
 3
 a
nd
 4
C
ri
ti
ca
l V
al
ue
s
S
pr
ea
d 
5
C
ri
ti
ca
l V
al
ue
s
S
pr
ea
ds
 6
 a
nd
 8
C
ri
ti
ca
l V
al
ue
s
S
pr
ea
d 
7
S
pr
ea
d 
1
 5
.9
16
20
3*
**
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 0
4/
20
/2
01
8
1%
2.
61
31
74
2.
73
02
20
2.
71
46
31
2.
63
68
98
2.
83
96
21
S
pr
ea
d 
2
 4
.2
58
24
4*
**
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 0
4/
20
/2
01
8
5%
2.
17
45
36
2.
19
45
15
2.
15
09
58
2.
16
83
35
2.
21
61
14
S
pr
ea
d 
3
 6
.1
82
14
0*
**
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 0
1/
01
/2
01
6
10
%
1.
97
04
99
1.
99
11
44
1.
96
01
73
1.
95
49
6
1.
99
00
65
S
pr
ea
d 
4
 1
.8
07
46
7
01
/0
7/
20
05
 -
 0
4/
20
/2
01
8
S
pr
ea
d 
5
 8
.8
09
54
0*
**
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 0
7/
19
/2
01
3
S
pr
ea
d 
6
 5
.8
13
20
2*
**
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 1
0/
07
/2
01
6
S
pr
ea
d 
7
3.
07
72
40
**
*
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 0
3/
30
/2
01
2
S
pr
ea
d 
8
1.
48
08
15
09
/2
0/
20
02
 -
 1
0/
07
/2
01
6
N
ot
es
.I
n
th
is
ta
bl
e,
w
e
re
po
rt
th
e
ou
tc
om
es
of
th
e
ri
gh
t-
ta
il
A
D
F
te
st
s
th
at
w
e
ru
n
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
on
ea
ch
sp
re
ad
.W
e
fi
nd
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
ev
id
en
ce
of
m
il
dl
y
ex
pl
os
iv
e
be
ha
vi
or
in
S
pr
ea
ds
1,
2,
3,
5,
6,
an
d
7.
**
*
de
no
te
s
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
W
e
us
e
th
e
S
ch
w
ar
z
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
C
ri
te
ri
on
to
se
le
ct
op
ti
m
al
la
g
in
th
e
te
st
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
13
w
ee
ks
is
m
ax
im
um
la
g
le
ng
th
co
ns
id
er
ed
w
he
n
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
au
to
m
at
ic
 la
g 
le
ng
th
 s
el
ec
ti
on
. C
ri
ti
ca
l v
al
ue
s 
ar
e 
si
m
ul
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 1
,0
00
 r
ep
li
ca
ti
on
s.
 I
ni
ti
al
 w
in
do
w
 s
iz
e:
 1
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
fu
ll
 s
am
pl
e.
22
Table 3: Periods of Mildly Explosive Behavior
Spread 1 August 3, 2007 - December 14, 2007 I
(3-Month LIBOR-OIS) September 19, 2008 - November 14, 2008 I
July 22, 2016 - October 28, 2016 I
Spread 2 August 17, 2007 - March 14, 2008 I
(3-Month ABCP-Treasury) August 12, 2016 - October 7, 2016 I
Spread 3 September 24, 2004 - March 24, 2006 D
(1-Year ARM-Treasury) August 17, 2007 - January 22, 2010 I
June 25, 2010 - July 29, 2011 D
February 24, 2012 - March 9, 2012 D
Spread 5 July 20, 2007 - March 27, 2009 I
(5-Year Aaa Private-Label CMBS-Treasury)
Spread 6 February 6, 2004 - May 21, 2004 D
(20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate) March 7, 2008 - April 18, 2008 I
July 4, 2008 - January 2, 2009 I
March 27, 2009 - April 10, 2009 I
January 23, 2015 - February 6, 2015 D
July 17, 2015 - March 4, 2016 I
Spread 7 April 15, 2005 - May 27, 2005 I
(20-Year BFV USD Bbb-Aa-Rated Corporate) November 7, 2008 - June 5, 2009 I
June 3, 2011 - June 24, 2011 I
Notes. In this table, we report the periods of mildly explosive behavior that we estimate for each spread. Fur-
thermore, we indicate whether those estimated time intervals are associated with generally increasing or generally
decreasing yield spreads. I: generally increasing yield spread. D: generally decreasing yield spread. Peaks of mildly
explosive behavior: Spread 1, 08/31/2007; Spread 2, 10/19/2007; Spread 3, 03/21/2008; Spread 5, 03/7/2008;
Spread 6, 11/21/2008; Spread 7, 12/19/2008.
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Figure 1: Mild Explosiveness, Date-Stamping, and Migration - A Diagram of the Statistical Procedure
The time series of interest 
does not exhibit 
explosive behavior
Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey­Fuller (GSADF) Tests 
Testing strategy to detect the presence of mildly explosive behavior in a time series of interest
Null Hypothesis: the time series of interest contains a unit root
Alternative Hypothesis: the time series of interest contains a root larger than one (at least locally)
Fail to Reject the 
Null Hypothesis 
Reject the 
Null Hypothesis 
The time series of interest 
exhibits (at least locally) 
explosive behavior
Identification of peaks in the sequences of 
BSADF test statistics for each time series of interest 
Regression­based tests of migration of mildly explosive behavior 
between peaks in the sequences of BSADF test statistics, 
for pairs of time series of interest 
Backward Supremum ADF (BSADF) Tests 
Backwards recursive technique for date­stamping periods 
of mildly explosive behavior in a time series of interest
Figure 2: Recursive Mechanism for GSADF Test Statistic
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Figure 3: Yield Spreads, Sequences of BSADF Test Statistics, Sequences of Critical Values, and Periods
of Mild Explosiveness
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27
Figure 4: Individual Yields for Yield Spreads Construction and Periods of Mild Explosiveness
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Notes. These graphs represent the yields used to construct the eight spreads described and analyzed in this paper.
Shaded areas represent the periods of mildly explosive behavior that we detect in the corresponding yield spreads.
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B Online Appendix - Data (Not for Publication)
The empirical methods described in the previous section are applied to the identification, if any, of
periods of explosive behavior in the eight time series in our sample. The objective is to determine the
beginning and the end of episodes of unstable dynamics, and to test for their migration across U.S. fixed
income markets, using data concerning eight interest rate spreads of interest. The series are collected
from Bloomberg and organized in a sample of weekly observations, as typical in the literature. We
consider a sample that spans between the week of September 20, 2002 and the week of April 20, 2018,
for a total of 814 weekly observations. However, as we describe later, some spreads may cover different
time periods between these two dates, depending on data availability. These eight spreads exhibit some
degree of heterogeneity that depends on the fixed income markets to which they refer, the maturity of
the underlying securities, and whether or not they were affected by specific policy measures implemented
by the Federal Reserve Bank, the United States Treasury, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
or by other policy interventions that occurred during the Great Financial Crisis. We will refer to these
spreads using a number and a descriptor, both reported in bold in the next paragraphs.
Spread 1 (3-Month LIBOR-OIS) is the 3-month LIBOR on unsecured deposits relative to the
overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate. The 3-month LIBOR is the interest rate that banks face when they
borrow unsecured funds on the interbank market with a 3-month maturity. The OIS rate is the fixed
interest rate that a bank receives in 3-month swaps between a fixed rate and a compound interest payment
on a notional amount to be determined with reference to the effective federal funds rate. The LIBOR-
OIS spread is widely perceived as an indicator of tensions in money markets, a measure of health of the
banking system, and as an index of risk and liquidity in the money market. It is a standard indicator
of liquidity premium of widespread use and was possibly affected by swap arrangements among central
banks during the Great Financial Crisis. While there are legitimate concerns that, after the LIBOR
scandal emerged in 2008, the use of the LIBOR for analysis may require caution, recent research suggests
that LIBOR rates still remain a good measure of financial distress.13
Spread 2 (3-Month ABCP-Treasury) is the yield on 3-month ABCP relative to Treasury Bills
of the same maturity. ABCP experienced a dramatic drop in transaction volumes during the financial
crisis, a shortage that made this spread particularly reflective of both liquidity and credit risk. Later on,
still during the crisis, this spread became a direct target of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
13On the one hand, some authors have compared the LIBOR with other short-term borrowing rates between January
2007 and May 2008 and reported some anomalous individual quotes, eventually concluding, however, that the evidence is
inconsistent with a material manipulation of the U.S. dollar 1-month LIBOR. On the other hand, other authors have found,
instead, evidence of manipulation. We acknowledge that the evidence is mixed and, in our analysis, limit the use of the
LIBOR to the computation of only one of the eight spreads in the sample.
i
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (which began operations on September 22, 2008, and was closed
on February 1, 2010) and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (which was announced on October 7,
2008, began purchases of commercial paper on October 27, 2008, and was closed on February 1, 2010).
Spread 3 and Spread 4 (1-Year ARM-Treasury and 5-Year ARM-Treasury) are the 1-year
ARM Average relative to Treasury Bills and the 5-year 5/1 Hybrid ARM relative to Treasury Notes,
respectively. They are representative of sub-prime rates charged on (innovative, before the financial
crisis) mortgage contracts and capture the strains more directly associated to the real estate market.
They can be seen as proxies of a mortgage default risk premium. The sample for Spread 3 spans the
period between the week of September 20, 2002 and the week of January 1, 2016 (a total of 694 weekly
observations). The sample for Spread 4 spans the period between the week of January 7, 2005 and the
week of April 20, 2018 (a total of 694 weekly observations).
Spread 5 (5-Year Aaa Private-Label CMBS-Treasury) is the 5-year Aaa private-label CMBS
relative to Treasury Bonds. In our paper, it is used to capture the freezing of the underlying spot market
between the summer of 2007 and early 2009 (Gorton, 2009b), later reversed, at least partially, by the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program (which began operation in March 2009 and
was closed for new loan extensions on June 30, 2010, with the final outstanding TALF loan being repaid
in full in October 2014). It represents the risk premium on private-label securitized mortgages, which
were often blamed as the root of the real estate crisis. However, this spread was not directly affected by
Quantitative Easing or other policy programs. The sample for this spread extends between the week of
September 20, 2002 and the week of July 19, 2013 (a total of 566 weekly observations).
Spread 6 (20-Year Moody’s Baa-Aaa-Rated Corporate) is the 20-year Moody’s Baa-rated
corporate bonds relative to Aaa-rated corporate rate. It is a traditional indicator of credit risk, discussed
extensively in the literature also because of its forecasting power for many asset returns (Bianchi and
Guidolin, 2014). It is a corporate default spread, never directly affected by Quantitative Easing or other
liquidity programs during the Great Financial Crisis. The sample for Spread 6 includes the weeks between
September 20, 2002 and the week of October 7, 2016 (a total of 734 weekly observations).
Spread 7 (20-Year Bloomberg Fair Value U.S. Dollar Composite Bbb-Aa-Rated Cor-
porate) is the 20-year Moody’s Bbb-rated corporate relative to Aa-rated corporate bond yield (a junk
spread). It is similar to Spread 6, but it refers to riskier bonds and was rarely directly affected by policy
interventions in the United States. Both Spread 6 and Spread 7 provide information about the cost of
funding for businesses and therefore represent a direct measure of strains in the private non-financial
sector. The sample for Spread 7 covers the period between the week of September 20, 2002 and the week
of March 30, 2012 (a total of 498 weekly observations).
ii
Spread 8 (30-Year Freddie Mac Conventional Fixed-Rate MBS-Treasury) is the 30-year
Freddie Mac conventional fixed-rate MBS relative to the Treasury Bonds. It captures the credit risk
of conventional mortgage products and is representative of the premium on agency mortgage-backed
securities. It was affected by the Large-Scale Asset Purchases (with short-term interest rates at nearly
zero, the Federal Reserve made a series of large-scale asset purchases between late 2008 and October
2014) and Quantitative Easing programs during the financial crisis.14 Spread 8 extends between the
week of September 20, 2002 and the week of October 7, 2016 (734 weekly observations).
As they are mostly computed from Treasury or corporate yields on assets with low risk, these spreads
reflect the credit-risk and (il)liquidity factors embedded in fixed income markets. Thus, the application
of our research design on these spreads allows us to study and characterize any explosive behaviors in
the price of credit risk plus the cost of illiquidity in each market.15 Generally positive and large skewness
is associated with a sizable divergence between mean and median in most spreads. Large excess kurtosis
appears in all spreads, but Spreads 3 and 8. Spreads 1-8 are plotted in the lower panels of Figure 3.
A feature common to all spreads in our dataset is a substantial and synchronized increase approxi-
mately located in the middle of the sample. All spreads peak around September 2008. Such a simultaneous
increase likely depends on a common factor and is, broadly speaking, the reflection of turbulence in fi-
nancial markets, which would later become the Great Financial Crisis. Except for Spread 3, all spreads
remain relatively flat between the beginning of the sample and 2007. Many of them are, in fact, close to
their historical means (Spreads 2, 4, 6, and 7) or generally fluctuate either slightly above (Spread 8) or
slightly below (Spreads 1, 3, and 5) their respective means. All spreads start widening in 2007, during
the initial stages of the Great Financial Crisis, when the economic and financial turmoil only appeared
to affect markets directly connected to the sub-prime real estate industry (see Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2012).
The eight interest rate spreads start rising well before Fall 2008 – i.e., the period often considered (maybe
incorrectly) to mark the official beginning of the Great Financial Crisis. During the crisis, the relative
increases in the spreads versus their pre-crisis levels range wildly. However, proportionally, they tend
to be milder for spreads with longer maturities. As observed in an unreported investigation of several
subperiods, variances and interquartile ranges show remarkable increments during the Great Financial
Crisis and return close to pre-crisis levels in the months after June 2009.
14We use yield spreads from two portfolios of securities related to real estates for which the construction of sufficiently
long time series is possible. Data for other mortgage rates are also available, among which a 5-year index of private-label
Aaa-rated fixed-rate CMBS yields, computed by Bloomberg/Morgan Stanley; an index of 30-year fixed-rate residential prime
mortgage rates computed by Freddie Mac; and a portfolio index series for lower-rated private-label MBS and CMBS yields.
However, these additional time series are too short to be meaningfully used within the econometric framework that we adopt.
15For convenience, a synthetic description of each spread is provided in Table C1. Their empirical distributions are reported
in Figure C1.
iii
ABX Indices. An ABX index is representative of a credit default swap (CDS) contract that pools
lists of exposures to mortgage-backed securities. The ABX.HE is a set of indices that tracks credit default
swaps on U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (see Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008; Fender and
Scheicher, 2009; Gorton, 2009a,b, for more detailed discussions). Four groups of ABX indices were issued
every six months between January 2006 and 2008. Each index tracks credit default swaps on a fixed
sample of twenty residential mortgage-backed securities, based on sub-prime mortgages issued in the
previous six months. Each group of indices includes five sub-indices corresponding to different rating
classes of residential mortgage-backed securities, namely AAA, AA, A, BBB, and BBB-. Classes BBB
and BBB- are the ratings for the riskiest sub-prime mortgage loans. As of 2007, these sub-indices became
closely monitored barometers for changes in U.S. sub-prime debt markets and soon came to represent a
focal point for all market participants. We plot these five sub-indices for each group in the four charts of
Figure C2.
ABX.HE.06-1 indices are the first issuance of this kind of CDS and refer to tranches of twenty
residential mortgage-backed securities issued in the second half of 2005. In the rolls that were released
every six months in the subsequent two years, due to the deepening of the sub-prime crisis, the number
of issuances dropped so much that ABX indices could not be constructed any longer, starting from 2008.
While each ABX.HE index contract was issued in a fixed notional amount in which the twenty underlying
tranches were equally weighted, during the life of the contract the notional amount would decline, typically
due to write-downs or pre-payments. In practice, ABX.HE indices functioned like a credit default swap
allowing investors to buy or sell insurance on the underlying tranches of residential mortgage-backed
securities, therefore providing both hedging and trading opportunities.16 Gorton (2009a,b) argue that
ABX.HE indices are a precious source of information regarding the pricing of sub-prime securities in
the initial phases of the Great Financial Crisis. Reportedly, investors used these indices as a reference
to evaluate their holdings of real-estate-related securities. The visible contraction of all these indices
in 2007 prompted several financial institutions to report large credit write-downs on sub-prime related
securities. Gorton (2009a) considers this event the de facto beginning of the 2007-08 panic. Later analysis
rationalized this episode as financial panic akin to bank runs. However, in this particular crisis, panic
affected the shadow banking system in addition to regulated depositary banks.
16As Gorton (2009a,b) point out, given that ABX.HE indices would trade based on price rather than a spread, and given
that the premium rate on each index was fixed at its launch, the market prices of such indices would adjust to reflect changes
either in risk aversion or in the market evaluation of the default risk related to the underlying residential mortgage-backed
securities. A price reduction below par can be interpreted as an increase in the market cost of protection relative to the
same cost at launch of the product.
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Table C1: Summary Statistics for Yield Spreads
Spread 1 Spread 2 Spread 3 Spread 4 Spread 5 Spread 6 Spread 7 Spread 8
 Mean 0.2633 0.3642 2.3479 1.7385 2.4024 1.1105 0.9030 0.9725
 Median 0.1479 0.2100 2.4300 1.5645 2.1200 0.9800 0.7705 0.9000
 Maximum 3.4948 4.2625 4.5900 4.4200 17.7300 3.4700 2.7574 2.5200
 Minimum 0.0475 0.0220 0.3900 0.8550 0.4800 0.5400 0.4645 -0.0500
 Std. Dev. 0.3317 0.4717 1.0357 0.5765 2.6462 0.4779 0.4772 0.4477
 Skewness 4.6011 3.8772 -0.1068 1.6774 2.8376 2.7882 2.2962 0.5684
 Kurtosis 32.4369 21.0475 2.6430 6.3635 11.9901 11.9466 7.9682 2.9471
 Observations 814 814 694 694 566 734 498 734
Notes. In this table, we report essential summary statistics for the eight spreads over their respective samples:
Sample for Spreads 1 and 2: week of September 20, 2002 to week of April 20, 2018 (a total of 814 weekly obser-
vations). Sample for Spread 3: week of September 20, 2002 to week of January 1, 2016 (a total of 694 weekly
observations). Sample for Spread 4: week of January 7, 2005 to week of April 20, 2018 (a total of 694 weekly
observations). Sample for Spread 5: week of September 20, 2002 to week of July 19, 2013 (a total of 566 weekly
observations). Sample for Spreads 6 and 8: week of September 20, 2002 to week of October 7, 2016 (a total of 734
weekly observations). Sample for Spread 7: week of September 20, 2002 to week of March 30, 2012 (a total of 498
weekly observations).
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Figure C1: Empirical Distributions of Yield Spreads
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D Online Appendix - An Alternative Test of Transmission Based on
Longstaff (2010) (Not for Publication)
We describe how the Granger causality approach that is described in Longstaff (2010) can be adapted
to one of the specific applications that we propose in this paper, namely when we test for migration of
mildly explosive behavior from ABX markets to fixed income markets in the United States. We offer an
alternative test of contagion from the ABX market to the fixed income markets in our sample by adopting
the following empirical strategy. First, we estimate the V AR model,
Yt = α+
K∑
k=1
βkYt−k +
4∑
j=1
γj∆%ABXt−j + εt, (1)
where Yt is a vector of dependent/endogenous variables including the eight spreads in the sample and
∆%ABXt−j is a time series of weekly returns computed from the same ABX.HE.BBB.06-1 variable that
we use. This model is initially estimated over an adjusted sample spanning a period between February
17, 2006 and March 30, 2012 – i.e., the longest common sample available for the time series variables in
our dataset. Based on the Bayesian Information Criterion, we select K = 2.
To better understand the dynamics in these markets, we estimate the resulting V AR recursively over
the same sample using a moving window of 52 weekly observations (i.e., one year of data). We take into
account possible autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity by computing Newey-West standard errors.
Finally, we recursively apply a Granger causality test of the null hypothesis, H0 : γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = 0,
on each equation in the V AR model.
For all eight regressions in the V AR model to be statistically valid, none of the time series in Yt
should contain unit roots. We adopt standard augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests to see whether
we may analyze the interest rate spreads in the sample under such assumption. In a few cases, from a
purely statistical point of view, unit roots may represent an issue. However, in economic and/or financial
terms, there is a strong case against the presence of unit roots in any of these spreads. In fact, a spread
containing a unit root will eventually become negative and spend an infinite amount of time providing
negative compensation to credit and liquidity risks. This occurrence makes little logical sense.
Nevertheless, given that Longstaff (2010), in his V AR specification, includes one-period changes in
the only two interest rate spreads that he uses, to be as consistent as possible with his empirical strategy,
we compute the first differences of all eight spreads in our sample and include them in the V AR model,
∆Yt = α+
K∑
k=1
βk∆Yt−k +
4∑
j=1
γj∆%ABXt−j + εt. (2)
viii
where, based on the Bayesian Information Criterion, we set K = 1.
When the time series of the p-value of a given test falls below the conventional thresholds of 10%,
5%, or 1% (an occurrence that is usually associated with a spike in the time series of the related test
statistic), the immediate implication is the rejection of the null hypothesis over a period of time spanning
the previous 52 weeks. A rejection of the null means that predictability from the ABX index returns for
the corresponding yield spread is statistically significant.
In this appendix, we include the plots of the rolling estimates of each of the eight equations, each
of them corresponding to one of the spreads in the sample, from V AR models (1) and (2). For each
equation, we report the F statistics of the recursive Granger causality tests and the corresponding p-
values; the alternative χ2 (Wald) statistics of the recursive Granger causality tests and the corresponding
p-values; and, for the sake of completeness, the rolling coefficients of determination. What we see is a
set of heterogeneous results that are difficult to interpret and that crucially depend on the time period
under investigation. On the contrary, the statistical strategy that we describe and then apply in our
paper provides, at least in our opinion, a much cleaner set of patterns and empirical outcomes (in our
applications) that turn out to be easier to interpret.
The main advantage of the approach that we present is that we are able to eliminate most arbitrariness
from the empirical investigation. The samples over which we test transmission and contagion, unlike
Longstaff (2010), are endogenously and clearly determined by a recursive methodology. If anything, one
should perhaps prefer and use a recursive or rolling version of the Granger causality test, along the lines
that have been explored and developed in some recent literature.
More specifically, in our paper, (i) we search for mildly explosive behavior in a set of time series and
explore to what extent such behavior sequentially migrates from a time series to another; (ii) the technique
that we use is concerned with and analyzes the tail behavior in the distribution of relevant statistical
quantities; (iii) in the framework that we describe, contagion and transmission are notions related to how
tail behaviors in the distributions of two or more time series are associated to each other; (iv) a Granger
causality test fails to reflect tail behavior; rather, it can only give information as to whether conditional
means are associated to each other.
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Highlights
• We describe a right-tail variation of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and use it to test for the
existence of mildly explosive behavior in eight U.S. fixed income yield spreads between September
2002 and April 2018.
• We find evidence of mildly explosive behavior in all but two spreads.
• We find statistical evidence of migration of mildly explosive behavior during the Great Financial
Crisis from spreads representing short-term funding markets to spreads with longer maturity.
• We empirically validate Gorton (2009a,b)’s conjecture that the financial panic of 2007-09 initially
spread from segments of the ABX market to other fixed income markets.
• The empirical approach we use takes away most arbitrariness from the investigation and endoge-
nously determines the samples over which we test transmission within a recursive methodology.
